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Abstract 
The Doha Trade Round maintains that a considerable effort will be given to take into 
account better the particular needs of developing nations.  Many low-income countries 
argue that the flexibility to invoke a special safeguard mechanism when faced with 
volatile commodity markets is a necessary condition for further market access reform.  
The implications of a safeguard for developing agriculture as a trade-off for lowering 
their tariff rates, is an important empirical question. 
  Two stochastic simulation experiments are developed using wheat as a case study 
to estimate the marginal effects of a safeguard in terms of domestic market stability and 
on developed exporting nations.  The results reveal that a safeguard for developing 
agriculture is minimally trade distorting and in general, costs less than one percent of 
total world welfare that would be realized if low-income countries were not granted a 
safeguard.  Furthermore, safeguards are an attractive policy tool because they are 
transparent, easy to use and are an automatic mechanism. 
 







   3 
Background 
WTO member countries have a number of legal means to cope with import surges.  For 
“fairly” traded imports they can rely on the provisions of Article XIX of the GATT and 
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards.  For “unfairly” traded imports they have 
recourse to countervailing duties and anti-dumping actions
1.  However, each of these 
trade actions requires the importing country to provide proof of injury and in the case of 
the general safeguard provision to provide compensation.  For low income countries, 
proving injury and providing compensation is often beyond their technical and financial 
capabilities.  For this reason, the Special Agricultural Safeguard (SSG) made available to 
member countries in the Uruguay Round (UR) of trade negotiations has considerable 
appeal to developing country importers.  First, the SSG was designed to counter import 
surges and sharp declines in import prices.  Second, the rules for its application are 
transparent and it requires no injury test, nor the provision of compensation.  However, 
only those countries who “tariffied” their non-tariff barriers during the UR are allowed to 
use the Special Agricultural Safeguard.  Of the 146 current members of the WTO only 39 
countries reserved the right to use the SSG, of which 29 are developing countries.  
However, since 1995, the use of the SSG has been dominated by three developed 
countries.
2  
  In the WTO agricultural negotiations leading up to the launch of the Doha 
Development Round (DDR) low income countries tabled numerous proposals calling for 
Special and Differential Treatment.  One aspect of Special and Differential Treatment 
                                            
1 These actions are governed by the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and the 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994.   
2 The three countries are: the United States, the European Union and Japan.    4 
mentioned in many of these proposals was the need for a Special Safeguard Mechanism 
to help manage import surges and rapid price declines in the price of staple commodities.   
The need to have developing countries fully “on-side” was demonstrated in Cancun 
in September 2002; with the failure of the WTO Ministerial meeting to push forward the 
trade liberalization process.  A well designed SSM might form an important part of an 
acceptable agricultural package for low-income countries.  The need for a SSM is 
recognized in several important WTO documents but the wording changes through time 
suggest a lack of consensus on the exact form a new SSM should take.   
After his first draft was met with stark criticism, chair of the agricultural 
negotiations, Stuart Harbinson tabled a revised modalities text on 18 March 2003 (WTO 
2003b).  In this text the wording surrounding a new special safeguard measure is as 
follows: 
•   The current SSG would cease to apply for developed countries. 
•   Developing countries could continue to use the current SSG for products 
identified in their UR tariff schedules. 
•   Developing countries can not apply the current SSG and a new SSM to a product, 
concurrently. 
•   Technical work will be undertaken on the development of a SSM. 
Finally, in the 13 September 2003 Draft Cancun Ministerial Text tabled by 
Mexican Foreign Minister Lois Ernesto Derbez the wording was refined to: “A special 
agricultural safeguard shall be established for use by developing countries subject to 
conditions for products to be determined (WTO 2003c).”   This commitment to an SSM, 
but the lack of detail on the exact parameters of a SSM suggests there is scope for   5 
research to shed light on this issue.
3  Basically, a SSM is a temporary tariff.  The 
economics of tariffs are well known.  Exporters favor the elimination of tariffs and 
importers lower them with great reluctance, in spite of the fact that there are often welfare 
gains in importing countries as a result of tariff elimination.  The attraction of an SSM, to 
an exporter, stems from the realization that the existence of an SSM might entice a low 
income country to lower its tariffs more than it would if the SSM did not exist.  The use 
of an SSM is discretionary; an importer has the right but not the obligation to use the 
SSM when it is triggered.  Hence, from the exporter’s perspective it might be better to 
face higher tariffs part of the time, than high tariffs all of the time.  This is clearly an 
empirical question that hinges on the size of tariff cuts, the size of the additional tariff an 
importer can impose when the SSM is triggered, how often the SSM is triggered, and on 
how often the importing country will actually use the SSM when it is triggered.  It is on 
these questions that this study is focused. 
Objectives 
Since the economic effects of a SSM are largely an empirical issue this study uses a case 
study approach.  Wheat has been chosen for analysis for a number of reasons: 1) it is a 
staple commodity; 2) it is of export interest to a number of developed countries; and 3) it 
is a major importable of low income countries.  The focus of this study is on three 
questions: 1) will an SSM stabilize commodity markets in low income countries; 2) does 
an SSM have the potential to entice low income countries to accept larger tariff cuts; and 
3) how costly would an SSM be for wheat exporters, who consist primarily of developed 
countries. 
                                            
3 Very little analysis of special safeguard mechanisms is available in the literature.  Somwaru and Skully 
have examined a special agricultural safeguard but using a methodology quite different from what is 
employed in this study. Ruffer and Vergano provide a good discussion of the rationale for an SSM.   6 
The Special Safeguard Mechanism 
None of the proposals tabled during the WTO negotiations contain explicit parameters for 
a SSM but many of the proposals make reference to the current SSG.  For that reason we 
have assumed that the parameters of a new SSM will mirror those of the current SSG.  
Consequently, the SSM will consist of a “price trigger” and a “volume trigger”.  A 
country can apply the price trigger safeguard whenever its import price falls to less than 
90 percent of the average price in the previous three years and the additional duty that can 
be levied increases the further the import price falls below the reference price.  In other 
words, the additional duty under the price trigger is an increasing function of a declining 
import price. The calculation of the volume trigger safeguard is more complex, but 
generally the larger the share of imports in domestic consumption, the smaller the import 
surge required to trigger the volume remedy.
4  The volume remedy is an additional tariff 
equal to one-third of the country’s applied tariff.  In this analysis it is assumed that a 
country will always apply a safeguard when it has the right to do so, and further if it has 
the choice of applying either the price or volume safeguard it will choose the one 
allowing the highest additional duty. 
The Model and Data 
 
The model is a static, synthetic, stochastic, partial equilibrium model of the wheat sector 
calibrated to supply and demand data averaged over 1999-2001.  Data on the supply, 
distribution and trade flows of wheat were obtained from the ERS/USDA PS&D database 
and FAOSTAT.  World prices for wheat were taken from the OECD’s database and 
reflect the free on board (fob) US dollar price per metric ton of wheat.  Exchange rate 
                                            
4 The trigger level also depends on the level of consumption in the current year in comparison to the 
pervious year.   7 
data for all countries was taken from the USDA Agricultural Exchange Rate Database 
and the International Monetary Fund’s Financial Statistics Yearbook for the period 1999-
2001.   
Thirty-eight countries/regions are included in the model.  Of these, 32 are low 
income net importing countries and 6 are large, net exporting nations.  Domestic 
equations for the net exporting countries are identical to net importing countries except 
there is no price adjustment for tariffs and there are modifications made to handle a few 
domestic policies in the European Union and US.  Finally, the market clearing condition 
that determines the world price is implemented by forcing the sum of net trade, across all 
of the countries in the model, to zero. The parameters in the model are largely derived 
from elasticities in the OECD’s AGLINK model. Tariff data and other data on border 
measures were taken primarily from the Agricultural Market Access Database (AMAD). 
In order to simulate the operation of the volume trigger of the SSM, pseudo-
random error terms are added to the supply and food demand equations.  Random shocks 
in an individual countries wheat supply and food wheat demand result in random net 
imports.  As net imports increase the volume trigger of the safeguard mechanism can be 
breached and the importing country is allowed to impose a safeguard duty.  Modeling the 
price trigger is more challenging. In order to introduce some differentiation in local price 
movements a pseudo-random error term was attached to the exchange rate in each 
countries price linkage equation.  Although it is impossible to introduce shipment-by-
shipment price variability; in this way some countries will be applying the price trigger   8 
while others aren’t, and the size of the duty allowed by the price trigger can vary across 
countries.
 5   
Policy Set 
The primary policies considered in this study are border policies, tariffs in particular.  
However, before moving to a detailed discussion of tariffs it is useful to outline the other 
policies explicitly incorporated into the model.  In terms of domestic policies only the 
United States loan rate policy and the EU’s intervention price are considered.  In the 
United States the average loan rate (1999-2001) was US$94.80/mt and the average farm 
price was US$96.63/mt.  Hence, in the baseline simulations the loan rate is not binding.  
However, in the stochastic simulations the farm price often drops below the loan rate.  In 
this case, the U. S. supply inducing price is not allowed to fall below US$94.80/mt and 
the government cost of an implied deficiency payment equal to the difference between 
the loan rate and the farm price is calculated.    
Calibrating the model in the EU is more difficult.
6  Substantial export subsidies 
were paid in 1999 when the intervention price was $119 Ecu/mt, and almost no export 
subsidies were paid in 2001 when the intervention price was $101 Ecu/mt.  However, the 
average farm price over this period is distorted through intervention buying, and 
furthermore, EU export subsidy payments during this period were $15 Ecu/mt.  We 
assume that the farm price equals the intervention price and then incorporate a $15 
Ecu/mt export subsidy payment by defining an EU export price of wheat.  This price is 
equal to the farm price minus $15 Ecu/mt, or $95.6 Ecu/mt.  When the simulations are 
                                            
5 More details on the way the pseudo-random errors were generated and some modifications made to them 
for the empirical analysis are contained in Grant. 
6 Another factor complicating the calibration is that the EU is defined as the EU-25 in this analysis to 
account for the imminent expansion of the EU to an additional ten countries.    9 
such that the world price falls below the $110.6 Ecu/mt intervention price, the model 
calculates the appropriate export subsidy and cost of maintaining the intervention price. 
Note also that one element of the liberalization scenarios is the reduction of the 
intervention price from $110.6 Ecu/mt to $101 Ecu/mt.   
For this study the tariffs in all countries are converted to their ad valorem 
equivalents.  The tariff structure across all net importing countries is remarkable. There 
exists a huge gap between bound and applied tariffs in many of these countries. The 
simple average difference between bound and applied tariff rates is 62 percentage points.  
The differences are further illustrated in Figure 1 where the countries have been rank 
ordered, with the country with the lowest bound tariff assigned number one and the 
country with the highest bound tariff assigned number 32.
7  For those countries with 
bound tariffs less than 100 percent only two countries apply tariffs above 50 percent and 
many of these countries apply tariffs of less than 10 percent.  Four of the countries with 
bound tariffs above 100 percent apply tariffs below 25 percent.  The data on applied and 
bound tariffs make it clear that only aggressive tariff cutting exercises in the wheat sector 
will have a significant liberalizing effect.  
These figures also beg the question of why countries with such large gaps 
between their bound and applied tariffs are worried about a special safeguard mechanism.  
Undesirable import surges can be remedied by raising applied tariffs.  There are at least 
three reasons why a country might not want to do this.  First, the applied tariffs might be 
specified in domestic legislation and hence are not easily changed.  Second, the “optics” 
of raising applied tariffs is not good since it makes it clear the government is favoring 
                                            
7 Japan has been excluded from this figure because its bound (396 percent) and applied tariffs (225 percent) 
compress the scale making it harder to read.    10
domestic producers over domestic consumers.  Finally, while wheat tariffs might not be a 
problem for most low income countries, there might be a few politically sensitive 
commodities where applied and bound tariffs are similar.  Since the SSM will apply to all 
commodities; if a country wants this instrument, for even a few commodities, it must 
support its use for all. 
Expected Outcomes   
As in most policy analysis the expected direction of change in the mean values of key 
variables is relatively straightforward.  However, an SSM has an implied objective of 
market stability although exactly what is to be stabilized is often left unstated.  Since the 
SSM is triggered by changes in prices and import quantities it seems reasonable to 
monitor the stability of these variables, especially given the current design of the 
safeguard mechanism.  The work of Zwart and Meilke provides a theoretical framework 
that is useful for this purpose.  Consider the following two-country model: 
DE = a – bPW,            [1] 
  SE = c + dPW + ε1,        [2] 
 D I   =   e   –   f P D ,         [3] 
  SI = g + hPD + ε2,        [4] 
  SE – DE = DI – SI,       [ 5 ]  
where, DE represents demand in the exporting nation, SE is supply in the exporting 
nation, DI and SI are demand and supply in the importing region respectively, PW is the 
world price and PD is the domestic price of the commodity.  ε1 and ε2 are random errors 
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Parameters (a) through (h) are supply and demand constants and slope coefficients.   11
   Zwart and Meilke show that under free trade, the domestic price equals the world 
price (PW) with expected value E[PW] and variance, var[PW]: 
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      [ 7 ]  
  The form of policy intervention in the empirical model is that of an ad valorem 
tariff illustrated in equation (8). 
  PD = γPW        [ 8 ]  
where,  
  γ = (1+t) and (t) is the ad valorem tariff rate. 
Because it is the importing country that implements a tariff policy, equations (3) and (4) 
can be re-expressed as, 
  DI = e – fγPW, and       [9] 
  SI = g + hγPW.       [ 1 0 ]  
Using equations (9) and (10) it can be shown that the expected value of the world price 
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  Equations (11) and (12) illustrate two things.  First, the expected world price 
decreases when an importing nation imposes a tariff because (1+t) is greater than one,   12
thereby increasing the denominator in both equations.  Second, the variance around world 
price is smaller compared to free trade because of the additional policy parameter in the 
denominator, but the variance of domestic price is higher by γ
2.  Gamma, in the above 
equations, can be reinterpreted as the additional tariff levied under either the price or 
volume based safeguard.  Consequently, it’s expected that a safeguard duty will increase 
the variance around domestic prices and lower the variance of world price, certeris 
paribus. 
Policy Scenarios                
The most detailed tariff cutting proposals tabled in the DDR are the cuts from bound rates 
contained in Mr. Harbinson’s draft text of 18 March 2003 and the United States original 
proposal to employ a Swiss-25 tariff reduction formula from applied rates (WTO 2003b).  
The tariff cuts proposed by Harbinson are shown in Table 2.  The Harbinson formula 
contains a harmonization element with higher tariffs subject to larger cuts than smaller 
tariffs.  In addition, the commitments for developing countries are lower than for 
developed countries.  However, given the huge gap between bound and applied tariffs the 
Harbinson formula, using average tariff cuts, would only lower applied tariffs in four 
countries: Japan (225 to 158 percent), Egypt (5 to 3.8 percent), the developed country 
group ( 121.5 to 81 percent) and the EU (62 to 37 percent).  The tariff cut in the EU is 
important as there are cases where the tariff is not high enough to “protect” the EU’s 
intervention price.  In such cases, the EU becomes a strict net importer of wheat.  
In order to analyze a more aggressive tariff cutting exercise the second scenario 
involves the use of a Swiss-25 harmonization formula to cut tariffs from applied rates, as 
was originally proposed by the United States (WTO).  Under this scenario all applied   13
tariffs are cut to 25 percent or less, and the tariff cutting exercise is binding on all 
countries.  Hence, the two scenarios presented involve one very conservative scenario, at 
least as far as reducing applied tariffs in the wheat sector are concerned and one 
aggressive scenario where all applied tariffs are reduced.  In both of these scenarios the 
EU’s intervention price is lowered to $101.25 Ecu/mt while US domestic policies are left 
unaltered.   
  In all, four policy experiments are reported: 1) Harbinson with no SSM; 2) Swiss-
25 with no SSM; 3) Harbinson with an SSM; and 4) Swiss-25 with an SSM.  Scenarios 
one and two are compared to the status quo simulation and scenarios three and four are 
compared to the comparable scenario with no SSM to isolate the price and welfare effects 
of an SSM.  The comparisons are based on the results obtained and averaged over 1000 
drawings of pseudo-random errors.  As a result it is possible to measure the number of 
times the SSM is triggered and its effects on the stability of all of the models endogenous 
variables.      
Scenario 1: Harbinson Tariff Cuts with No SSM 
The impacts of the Harbinson (HB) scenario on most countries are small (Tables 2 and 
3).  World prices rise but by 3.4 percent because the HB tariff cutting proposal is binding 
on only four countries. Domestic price variability in all three net importing countries that 
reduce tariffs declines while domestic price stability decreases to a lesser extent for all 
but one of the 31 net importing countries (Brazil) not making tariff cuts (Table 2).  For 
most countries, the 3.4 percent world price increase is transmitted directly into a domestic 
price increase   14
  With the exception of Japan, the developed country group and the six net 
exporters, low income countries suffer small welfare losses from liberalization (Table 3).  
The losses stem from the decline in consumer surplus from higher food prices, and in 
some cases (Egypt) from losses in tariff revenue as net importers reduce their demand for 
higher priced imports.  The biggest winners are Japanese and developed country group 
consumers with 30.1 percent and 14.7 percent gains in consumer surplus, as well as their 
governments through increased tariff revenue (38.8 percent and 1.2 percent, 
respectively).  Net imports by Japan increase by 1.2 mmt and by 0.54 mmt in the 
developed country group.  In the EU and US the cost of their domestic support programs 
fall by 96 and 75 percent, respectively ($157 and $90 million). 
Globally, world welfare increases by 0.7 percent ($716 million).  The distribution 
of welfare changes in the Harbinson scenario is mixed. Developed country exporters gain 
but the Harbinson tariff cuts leave trade flows and welfare distributions virtually 
unchanged.  The only significant gains accrue to developed country importers (Japan and 
the developed country group).   Low income countries lose with Indonesia (-6.5 percent), 
Nigeria (-5.0 percent) and North African (-5.0 percent) countries losing the most, albeit 
the losses in all cases are small. 
Scenario 2: Swiss-25 Tariff Cuts with No SSM 
Applying a Swiss-25 tariff cutting formula, from applied rates, results in all countries 
with positive tariffs facing a reduction commitment (Tables 4 and 5).  As a result, world 
prices rise 5.7 percent.  Following the tariff cuts 25 low income countries face higher 
domestic prices, and, with the exception of Indonesia, prices have been stabilized in 30 
low income countries.      15
World welfare increases by 1.6 percent or $1.8 billion. Among the top net 
exporting nations, Australia and Canada are the biggest gainers at roughly 3.5 percent.  
Low income countries, as a group, lose economic welfare under the Swiss-25 scenario.  
Nigeria whose applied tariff drops from 80.7 percent to 19.1 percent under this scenario 
illustrates the gains from trade.  Nigerian wheat production declines by 22.1 percent and 
wheat imports rise by 0.9 mmt.  Total economic welfare improves by 10.7 percent driven 
by a gain of 104 percent in consumer surplus.  Conversely, the African Developing 
Group (AFD) whose applied tariff drops from 29.2 to 13.4 percent loses economic 
welfare (-2.5 percent).  In the AFD, the 47 percent drop in tariff revenue is more than 
enough to offset the 10.3 percent increase in consumer surplus. Again, the major gains 
under a Swiss-25 tariff cut accrue to developed country importers, where steep applied 
tariffs are cut to less than 25 percent.  
Scenario 3: Harbinson Tariff Cuts  with an SSM 
We now turn to an examination of the effects of an SSM when it is combined with a 
particular tariff cutting formula (Tables 6 and 7).  In this scenario, the Harbinson tariff 
cutting proposal without an SSM is compared to the Harbinson tariff cutting proposal 
with an SSM.  The SSM results in domestic prices rising and becoming less stable in 16 
of 31 low income countries.  However, imports in 26 low income countries are stabilized, 
although the stability effects are generally quite small. World prices fall slightly (0.2 
percent) as a result of the SSM causing increased production and lower consumption in 
the majority of small, low income countries. Morocco and Nigeria experience large 
increases in the standard deviation of domestic prices because of the size and frequency 
of safeguard duties.  Least developed African countries (NAG and SAG regions) increase   16
their domestic price of wheat and also stabilize there domestic wheat prices with an SSM.  
Conversely, in Ethiopia’s case, a one percent increase in average domestic prices comes 
with a 4 percent increase in price volatility. 
  Among the exporting nations, Canada suffers a drop in its price of wheat  (-0.20 
percent) and an increase in its producer price variability (2.0 percent).  The small 
decrease in world price is accompanied by small reductions in the domestic price 
variation in the US (-0.2 percent) and the EU (-0.04 percent), however, the tiny drop in 
world price increases the cost of domestic farm programs by 18.4 percent in the US and 
5.4 percent in the EU. 
The welfare cost of an SSM under the Harbinson proposal is $146.1 million. This 
needs to be taken in context with the welfare gain from trade liberalization under the 
Harbinson formula of $716 million.  Individual developing countries tend to gain by 
using the SSM, however the greater losses occur in Morocco  (-0.36 percent), Nigeria     
(-4.0 percent) and the AFD (-0.3 percent).     
Swiss-25 Tariff Cuts with an SSM 
The results of allowing an SSM along with the reduction of applied tariffs using a Swiss-
25 formula are summarized in Tables 8 and 9.  World price and variance changes are 
small.  Domestic prices in 16 of 31 low income countries rise from use of the SSM and 
domestic prices are stabilized in 18 countries.  Imports decline in 19 of 31 low income 
countries but are stabilized in an astounding 27 of 31 low income countries.  On this 
criterion alone the SSM would have to be considered a major success.   
Under the Swiss-25 scenario the world welfare cost of the SSM is only $133 
million compared to a welfare gain of $1.79 billion from liberalization using a Swiss-25   17
formula with no SSM (Table 5).  The low cost of the SSM stems from the fact that the 
additional duties allowed under the volume trigger decline as applied tariffs fall.  
Developed exporting nations loose slightly in terms of net national welfare and in the 
case of the US and EU, both countries face rising costs of their domestic programs of 18 
and 4.4 percent respectively.  Among the developing countries Nigeria is the major looser 
as average prices increase 7.3 percent but this rise is accompanied by a 22.8 percent 
decline in the standard deviation of domestic prices.  Ethiopia, a least developed country, 
looses slightly as the increase in tariff revenue and producer surplus of 40.5 and 1.8 
percent is not enough to offset the loss in consumer surplus of 1.5 percent.  Prices rise 
slightly in the Philippines but they are much more stable, as are net imports whose 
variability is reduced by 12.5 percent.   
Conclusions 
Summarizing the results of this analysis is difficult because in some sense each country 
has a different stake in the trade negotiations depending on its initial tariff levels and 
trade position in the wheat market.  However, some general observations are possible.   
First, the potential use of the SSM increases as the degree of trade liberalization 
increases and domestic prices fall.  Second, the larger the trade reforms, the smaller the 
average SSM duty.
8  Third, nearly all low income countries lose economic welfare under 
Harbinson and Swiss-25 reforms, Argentina and Kazakhstan two low income wheat 
exporters are the only exceptions. These results are similar to those obtained by Vanzetti 
and Peters in a more comprehensive analysis of the effects of trade liberalization on 
developing countries.  The largest losers are: Indonesia (-10.6 percent), the North Africa 
                                            
8 Under Harbinson reforms the average volume based SSM duty is 4.5 percent and under the Swiss-25 
reforms the average SSM duty is 2.4 percent.   18
Group (-8.12 percent), South Korea (-6.13 percent), United Arab Emirates (-5.2 percent), 
the Central American Group (-5.2 percent), and the South Africa Group (-5.1 percent) 
where initial applied tariffs are zero or low.  
Fourth, under the Harbinson reform scenario with an SSM six low income 
countries lose economic welfare, and the loss of consumer surplus in two countries as a 
result of applying the SSM is greater than two percent: Nigeria (-13.0 percent) and Africa 
Developing Group (-2.4 percent).  The same is true, although the magnitudes differ, for 
these same two countries using a SSM under Swiss-25 reforms.   Fifth, the SSM, 
especially under Swiss-25 reforms significantly stabilizes the level of imports in nearly 
all low income countries and stabilizes producer surplus in 23 of 27 low income 
countries. Finally, as the tariff cuts get more aggressive the gains in economic welfare not 
only get bigger but the cost of allowing a SSM become smaller.  This result is more 
obvious in Grant (2003) where he considered a larger range of tariff cutting scenarios.   
A Special Safeguard Mechanism does have the capacity to stabilize the imports 
and producer surplus of many low income countries under trade liberalization.  However, 
our results suggest that many low income countries will lose from trade reform in the 
wheat market so they are unlikely to be enthusiastic supporters of trade liberalization for 
this commodity.  Conversely, developed countries, both importers and exporters gain 
from wheat trade liberalization.  From the perspective of developed country exporters, an 
SSM costs, in welfare terms, only a small fraction of the gains from liberalization.  
Hence, if developing countries are willing to accept larger cuts in tariffs for an SSM, it is 
a trade-off developed countries should accept – at least at far as the wheat market is 
concerned.     19
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Table 1:  Harbinson Tariff Reduction Commitments 
Development 
Status Agricultural  Tariff 
Reduction 
Commitment Minimum  Cut 
Developed  T > 90%  60%  45% 
  15% < T <=  90%  50%  35% 
  T <= 15%  40%  25% 
Developing  T > 120%  40%  30% 
  60% < T <= 120%  35%  25% 
  20% < T <= 60%  30  20 
  T <= 20%  25%  15% 
 “SP”  Products  10%  5% 
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Table 2: Harbinson Tariff - No SSM 
Wheat Price (%)
Wheat Production  
(%)
Total Wheat Use 
(%)
Net Trade Wheat 
(%)
Net Trade Wheat 
(1000mt)
COUNTRY Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Base HB
Developed
Australia 3.412 -10.968 1.958 0.653 -0.813 -7.889 3.128 0.662 16,768.39 #######
Canada 3.419 -14.608 2.055 1.089 -2.062 -11.930 3.856 0.771 17,153.12 #######
EU-25 -5.106 595.769 -3.119 -23.222 3.133 256.395 -72.593 -31.107 9,807.70 2,687.97
Israel 3.422 -12.129 1.307 -12.129 -1.798 -7.079 -1.974 -7.308 -1,475.08 -1,445.97
Japan -17.766 -22.907 -22.212 -6.104 16.356 -19.452 20.613 -18.968 -5,418.56 -6,535.52
USA 2.733 14.387 1.235 -1.870 -1.634 -13.607 5.004 -0.739 26,048.03 #######
DCG -15.705 -30.669 -21.929 -17.490 9.316 -11.794 46.594 -19.991 -1,156.74 -1,695.70
Developing
Algeria 3.403 -16.304 2.066 -0.154 -0.711 -3.127 -1.477 -1.493 -4,945.30 -4,872.26
Argentina 3.416 -17.820 1.844 0.992 -1.072 -1.656 3.115 0.958 11,150.22 #######
Brazil 3.440 0.548 2.366 0.145 -1.910 0.367 -3.321 0.421 -7,280.70 -7,038.91
China 2.999 -9.676 0.414 0.752 -1.905 -6.796 1,449.741 3.943 173.01 2,681.18
Columbia 3.410 -10.455 -1.165 -2.294 -1.193 -2.294 -1,166.67 -1,152.75
Egypt 2.197 -7.928 1.034 -1.940 -0.457 -0.848 -1.952 -2.041 -6,284.31 -6,161.64
Indonesia 3.420 -0.631 -3.399 -0.570 -3.369 -0.570 -3,821.70 -3,692.94
Iran 3.417 -16.294 2.193 -0.746 -0.609 -0.972 -4.334 -1.456 -6,360.47 -6,084.79
Iraq 3.416 -17.820 2.202 -0.507 -0.274 0.031 -0.796 0.023 -2,970.00 -2,946.36
Kazakhstan 3.403 -3.181 1.696 -0.664 -0.937 -1.124 4.951 -0.871 4,700.48 4,933.20
Malaysia 3.416 -17.820 -1.009 -3.490 -1.009 -3.490 -1,139.14 -1,127.64
Mexico 3.418 -13.897 2.268 -4.056 -1.752 -6.556 -7.026 -7.749 -2,442.63 -2,271.02
Morocco 3.409 -16.397 3.099 -0.211 -0.732 -1.502 -3.539 -0.660 -3,221.48 -3,107.47
Nigeria 3.417 -13.273 2.491 -0.338 -4.902 -3.887 -5.082 -3.927 -1,914.25 -1,816.96
Peru 3.413 -16.615 2.573 -5.961 -1.154 -1.771 -1.648 -2.684 -1,375.52 -1,352.85
Philippinnes 3.415 -11.645 -3.341 -8.559 -3.267 -8.559 -2,990.26 -2,892.58
South Korea 3.431 -4.408 -3.670 -4.483 -3.587 -4.483 -3,537.44 -3,410.54
Tunisia 3.402 -16.371 2.134 -0.551 -0.816 -0.713 -3.908 -1.292 -1,205.84 -1,158.71
United A.E 3.416 -17.820 -1.759 -0.320 -1.760 -0.320 -700.82 -688.48
Venezuela 3.413 -16.982 1.818 -1.685 -1.455 -3.580 -1.456 -3.582 -1,352.31 -1,332.62
AFD 3.403 -14.242 3.738 -1.596 -2.426 -3.621 -4.026 -4.815 -1,669.71 -1,602.48
CTA 3.416 -16.367 -1.655 -2.066 -1.657 -2.066 -3,148.29 -3,096.13
STA 3.409 -10.953 3.317 -2.512 -1.553 -6.737 -7.750 -5.777 -1,614.77 -1,489.62
ASG 3.418 -13.347 2.942 -1.219 -2.404 -6.926 -5.497 -6.366 -2,854.22 -2,697.32
MEG 3.416 -17.927 -1.290 -3.291 -1.297 -3.291 -1,243.28 -1,227.16
ROW 3.417 -17.298 2.600 -4.728 -2.538 -1.969 -13.031 -4.357 -6,652.56 -5,785.65
Least Developed
Bangladesh 3.415 -16.729 1.151 -0.644 -1.797 -0.661 -5.238 -1.015 -1,490.87 -1,412.78
Ethiopia 3.357 -16.467 1.301 -0.757 -1.571 -1.045 -9.600 -1.810 -816.57 -738.18
Yemen 3.415 -15.127 0.788 -0.104 -1.367 -0.726 -1.536 -0.762 -1,952.02 -1,922.04
SAG 3.417 -13.897 2.813 -5.841 -2.166 -5.681 -2.976 -6.656 -1,857.71 -1,802.41
NAG 3.398 -14.828 2.999 -2.302 -2.933 -4.400 -3.066 -4.519 -1,387.14 -1,344.61
WORLD 3.416 -17.820 -0.105 -4.440 -0.103 -4.440 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00
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COUNTRY Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev
Developed
Australia -1.876 -11.835 -1.354 -3.741 4.891 3.709 2.116 3.923
Canada -7.111 -18.026 -1.291 -2.306 4.969 3.224 2.005 4.043
EU-25 6.540 621.668 6.257 113.798 -7.336 -33.422 (-95.927) -84.789 0.680 11.489
Israel -7.044 -15.595 -0.569 -0.267 4.238 -10.848 1.422 -8.884 -0.893 -0.451
Japan 83.239 4.374 30.128 -6.359 -38.356 -26.566 38.836 6.554 30.027 -0.899
USA -13.236 -23.735 -0.612 -1.612 3.515 0.141 (-74.537) -55.483 0.450 2.100
DCG 45.012 -16.528 14.271 0.963 -38.961 -35.615 1.237 -47.151 6.205 -5.880
Developing
Algeria -1.431 -3.800 4.915 2.595 1.918 -1.801 -1.006 -1.926
Argentina -2.167 -2.763 4.759 3.071 2.027 3.155
Brazil -12.718 -6.635 -3.492 -1.542 5.291 3.577 -0.006 3.710 -2.095 -0.991
China -4.750 -11.570 -3.702 -7.937 3.262 5.914 0.000 0.000 -0.086 1.219
Columbia -2.362 -3.473 3.410 -10.455 2.213 -3.671 -1.904 -2.799
Egypt -0.918 -1.280 2.865 -2.991 -23.900 -22.692 -0.597 -0.879
Indonesia -6.550 -3.996 -6.550 -3.996
Iran -1.242 -1.612 5.048 1.484 -0.495 -0.542
Iraq -0.529 -0.232 4.994 2.242 -0.429 -0.165
Kazakhstan -5.576 -5.728 -0.622 -0.420 4.516 1.434 0.734 1.004
Malaysia -2.106 -4.544 2.402 -9.089 -1.835 -3.883
Mexico -15.667 -21.464 -3.020 -6.786 5.108 -3.331 -3.696 1.790 -1.136 -1.989
Morocco -1.510 -2.269 6.129 3.235 -0.168 3.205 -0.786 -0.184
Nigeria -9.525 -8.645 5.396 2.636 -1.731 3.460 -5.042 -3.711
Peru -2.429 -2.977 5.478 -5.162 1.754 -1.742 -1.658 -1.978
Philippinnes -14.900 -18.426 -2.407 -2.756 0.114 2.021 -2.932 -4.166
South Korea -15.129 -12.747 -2.873 -5.058 3.431 -4.408 -0.236 12.504 -3.775 -7.219
Tunisia -1.624 -1.520 4.968 1.680 -0.517 3.357 -0.669 -0.679
United A.E -3.368 -2.098 3.416 -17.820 1.648 3.132 -3.172 -1.969
Venezuela -2.898 -4.996 4.664 -2.448 1.947 -4.949 -2.413 -4.031
AFD -4.808 -5.940 7.265 1.993 -0.644 3.559 -2.860 -3.189
CTA -3.384 -3.733 3.416 -16.367 1.746 -0.299 -3.162 -3.469
STA -3.143 -8.260 6.666 0.523 -4.459 2.764 -1.147 -2.699
ASG -5.911 -16.189 -4.590 -7.916 6.043 1.672 -2.160 3.274 -2.281 -3.359
MEG -2.571 -4.576 3.416 -17.927 2.109 -5.916 -2.488 -4.473
ROW -5.619 -19.816 -4.903 -3.824 5.534 -3.988 -9.858 1.826 -1.059 -1.994
Least Developed
Bangladesh -3.537 -2.524 4.125 -4.908 -1.902 3.446 -1.038 -1.705
Ethiopia -3.102 -2.565 4.163 -0.803 -6.135 1.881 -0.573 -1.183
Yemen -2.699 -2.126 3.867 0.861 -2.381 -2.048
SAG -4.306 -7.841 5.823 -4.150 0.410 2.111 -3.160 -6.590
NAG -5.811 -7.225 6.051 0.376 0.332 2.980 -5.029 -6.494
WORLD 0.645 0.604
$716,244,000 Welfare Difference From Baseline ($US)
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Table 4: Swiss-25 Tariff Cut - No SSM 




Total Wheat Use 
(%)
Net Trade Wheat 
(%)
Net Trade Wheat 
(1000mt)
COUNTRY Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Base SWA
Developed
Australia 5.642 -13.072 3.237 1.017 -1.345 -9.329 5.173 1.055 16,768.39 17,636
Canada 5.654 -16.884 3.398 1.833 -3.410 -13.890 6.376 1.649 17,153.12 18,247
EU-25 -4.356 664.998 -2.661 -17.260 2.673 291.169 -61.932 -14.893 9,807.70 3,734
Israel 4.853 -14.172 1.853 -14.172 -2.551 -8.196 -2.799 -8.464 -1,475.08 -1,434
Japan -60.169 -62.680 -74.579 -19.480 55.393 -50.339 69.735 -49.847 -5,418.56 -9,197
USA 5.141 22.020 2.323 -2.255 -2.702 -16.720 8.914 -0.537 26,048.03 28,370
DCG -42.446 -56.419 -59.267 -30.031 25.179 -19.080 125.929 -34.333 -1,156.74 -2,613
Developing
Algeria 5.337 -22.128 3.240 -0.301 -1.115 -4.069 -2.317 -2.136 -4,945.30 -4,831
Argentina 5.648 -22.230 3.049 1.668 -1.773 -2.179 5.150 1.694 11,150.22 11,724
Brazil 1.573 -0.953 1.082 0.025 -0.873 -0.971 -1.519 -0.475 -7,280.70 -7,170
China 5.208 -13.983 0.719 1.120 -3.309 -10.222 2,517.912 5.867 173.01 4,529
Columbia 0.491 -17.810 -0.168 -3.605 -0.172 -3.605 -1,166.67 -1,165
Egypt 4.865 -6.308 2.289 -1.617 -1.013 -0.578 -4.323 -1.548 -6,284.31 -6,013
Indonesia 5.659 0.986 -5.624 0.203 -5.575 0.203 -3,821.70 -3,609
Iran 5.648 -20.436 3.626 -0.901 -1.006 -1.188 -7.165 -1.769 -6,360.47 -5,905
Iraq 5.648 -22.230 3.640 -0.679 -0.452 0.054 -1.316 0.088 -2,970.00 -2,931
Kazakhstan 5.622 -3.794 2.802 -0.528 -1.548 -1.263 8.179 -0.723 4,700.48 5,085
Malaysia 2.412 -24.612 -0.712 -4.425 -0.712 -4.425 -1,139.14 -1,131
Mexico -6.281 -26.033 -4.167 -7.027 3.219 -11.468 12.909 -13.634 -2,442.63 -2,758
Morocco -17.126 -37.810 -15.568 -0.324 3.674 -3.557 17.777 -1.289 -3,221.48 -3,794
Nigeria -30.355 -44.716 -22.136 -1.298 43.555 -11.871 45.157 -12.034 -1,914.25 -2,779
Peru -2.193 -27.229 -1.653 -9.210 0.741 -2.671 1.059 -4.070 -1,375.52 -1,390
Philippinnes 0.668 -18.204 -0.653 -13.461 -0.638 -13.461 -2,990.26 -2,971
South Korea 5.065 -3.377 -5.417 -3.575 -5.295 -3.575 -3,537.44 -3,350
Tunisia -2.208 -27.702 -1.385 -1.007 0.530 -1.026 2.537 -2.073 -1,205.84 -1,236
United A.E 5.040 -22.678 -2.595 -0.462 -2.597 -0.462 -700.82 -683
Venezuela 0.498 -25.629 0.266 -2.115 -0.212 -5.207 -0.213 -5.211 -1,352.31 -1,349
AFD -7.174 -29.082 -7.880 -2.771 5.114 -7.581 8.488 -9.722 -1,669.71 -1,811
CTA 4.959 -21.004 -2.404 -2.708 -2.405 -2.708 -3,148.29 -3,073
STA 2.751 -16.758 2.677 -3.547 -1.254 -9.956 -6.255 -8.392 -1,614.77 -1,514
ASG 2.983 -17.590 2.567 -0.959 -2.097 -9.048 -4.797 -7.448 -2,854.22 -2,717
MEG 5.669 -22.388 -2.141 -4.019 -2.153 -4.019 -1,243.28 -1,217
ROW 5.649 -21.274 4.299 -5.768 -4.197 -2.275 -21.546 -5.173 -6,652.56 -5,219
Least Developed
Bangladesh 4.744 -21.383 1.599 -0.562 -2.496 -0.852 -7.275 -1.216 -1,490.87 -1,382
Ethiopia 4.719 -21.285 1.829 -0.891 -2.208 -1.378 -13.496 -2.304 -816.57 -706
Yemen 5.646 -18.790 1.303 -0.166 -2.260 -0.848 -2.539 -0.897 -1,952.02 -1,902
SAG 4.428 -17.279 3.646 -7.295 -2.807 -7.107 -3.857 -8.336 -1,857.71 -1,786
NAG 4.300 -21.051 3.795 -3.163 -3.711 -6.224 -3.879 -6.391 -1,387.14 -1,333
WORLD 5.648 -22.230 0.210 -6.666 0.206 -6.666 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00
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COUNTRY Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev
Developed
Australia -3.090 -14.504 -2.232 -4.699 8.135 6.513 3.529 6.650
Canada -11.576 -22.373 -2.129 -3.067 8.273 6.411 3.360 6.990
EU-25 5.579 690.356 5.337 131.119 -6.265 -20.175 -97.728 -90.351 0.721 12.480
Israel -9.895 -19.025 -0.806 -0.374 6.030 -12.377 -13.690 -24.372 -1.459 -0.642
Japan 388.373 -17.292 118.469 -19.283 -91.150 -76.807 -44.415 -67.263 75.396 -30.441
USA -21.251 -31.576 -1.010 -2.025 6.677 2.652 -92.394 -79.046 0.758 3.343
DCG 141.639 -32.613 40.817 8.262 -83.009 -71.337 -58.940 -86.832 11.548 -8.158
Developing
Algeria -2.239 -5.128 7.748 4.093 -7.966 -12.004 -1.657 -2.424
Argentina -3.568 -3.986 7.916 6.193 3.385 5.669
Brazil -6.012 -4.487 -1.611 -1.890 2.399 1.570 -31.134 -30.017 -3.189 -0.731
China -8.169 -17.436 -6.382 -12.434 5.668 10.206 0.000 0.000 -0.124 2.379
Columbia -0.360 -3.827 0.491 -17.810 -33.880 -38.904 -3.062 -3.934
Egypt -2.023 -1.562 6.410 -0.281 -15.036 -11.609 -0.983 -1.225
Indonesia -10.662 -5.521 -10.662 -5.521
Iran -2.047 -2.225 8.419 3.183 -0.804 -0.764
Iraq -0.874 -0.392 8.340 4.154 -0.707 -0.280
Kazakhstan -9.107 -8.065 -1.025 -0.621 7.540 3.427 1.239 1.898
Malaysia -1.494 -5.186 -27.501 -37.874 -3.057 -4.933
Mexico 30.568 -16.433 5.612 -6.732 -9.274 -15.920 -42.988 -54.120 -0.778 -2.899
Morocco 7.727 0.058 -28.200 -19.017 -57.603 -63.817 0.289 -0.487
Nigeria 103.500 26.222 -42.476 -32.068 -63.568 -75.281 10.674 -8.450
Peru 1.554 -1.912 -3.574 -14.249 -40.710 -44.380 -2.705 -2.738
Philippinnes -3.536 -20.067 -0.485 -2.761 -33.776 -34.347 -4.430 -5.896
South Korea -21.745 -15.662 -4.221 -5.303 5.065 -3.377 -14.540 5.921 -6.138 -8.178
Tunisia 1.044 -0.516 -3.255 -4.769 -39.772 -41.453 -0.866 -1.011
United A.E -4.947 -3.079 5.040 -22.678 -11.735 -9.693 -5.198 -3.175
Venezuela -0.446 -5.421 0.645 -6.831 -33.902 -39.742 -3.782 -5.585
AFD 10.322 -2.897 -14.880 -10.801 -46.808 -51.531 -2.547 -5.426
CTA -4.892 -5.132 4.959 -21.004 -12.496 -14.321 -5.199 -5.037
STA -2.553 -11.192 5.331 -1.304 -29.709 -26.675 -1.712 -3.610
ASG -5.192 -20.183 -4.024 -9.425 5.267 1.460 -27.863 -24.315 -3.492 -4.557
MEG -4.243 -6.132 5.669 -22.388 14.907 3.728 -4.090 -6.001
ROW -9.178 -25.278 -8.027 -5.586 9.248 -3.558 -16.901 3.886 -1.668 -3.164
Least Developed
Bangladesh -4.894 -3.424 5.746 -5.281 -18.573 -12.234 -1.681 -2.778
Ethiopia -4.344 -3.509 5.873 -0.411 -23.215 -13.719 -0.898 -1.909
Yemen -4.432 -3.142 6.411 2.184 -3.908 -3.048
SAG -5.560 -9.879 7.581 -5.091 -18.091 -16.091 -5.103 -8.760
NAG -7.336 -9.790 7.678 0.163 -19.040 -16.281 -8.120 -9.547
WORLD 1.611 -1.078
$1,787,845,000 Welfare Difference From Baseline ($US)
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Table 6: Harbinson Tariff Cut - With SSM 




Total Wheat Use 
(%)
Net Trade Wheat 
(%)
Net Trade Wheat 
(1000mt)
COUNTRY Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev HB HB SSG
Developed
Australia -0.197 1.771 -0.115 -0.202 0.049 1.175 -0.181 -0.216 17,292.93 17,262
Canada -0.198 2.650 -0.120 -0.157 0.126 2.034 -0.222 -0.115 17,814.51 17,775
EU-25 -0.041 -0.336 -0.025 -0.415 0.023 -0.323 -2.020 -1.226 2,687.97 2,634
Israel -0.198 2.331 -0.077 2.331 0.109 1.361 0.120 1.405 -1,445.97 -1,448
Japan -0.194 0.879 -0.256 0.259 0.126 0.695 0.153 0.727 -6,535.52 -6,546
USA -0.156 0.529 -0.072 -0.045 0.099 2.273 -0.282 -0.165 27,351.35 27,274
DCG -0.197 2.016 -0.297 0.941 0.090 0.501 0.336 1.067 -1,695.70 -1,701
Developing
Algeria -0.041 0.694 -0.025 -0.449 0.009 -0.810 0.019 -1.188 -4,872.26 -4,873
Argentina -0.198 3.164 -0.108 -0.142 0.065 0.268 -0.181 -0.135 11,497.57 11,477
Brazil 0.787 -8.436 0.547 -2.945 -0.461 -8.415 -0.813 -9.208 -7,038.91 -6,982
China -0.191 2.872 -0.027 -0.165 0.127 2.233 -6.125 -0.616 2,681.18 2,517
Columbia 0.395 -3.411 -0.141 -5.923 -0.145 -5.923 -1,152.75 -1,151
Egypt 0.121 -1.471 0.057 -1.611 -0.026 -1.719 -0.112 -2.954 -6,161.64 -6,155
Indonesia -0.017 -2.821 0.018 -1.386 0.018 -1.386 -3,692.94 -3,694
Iran -0.198 2.870 -0.128 0.057 0.037 0.138 0.271 0.154 -6,084.79 -6,101
Iraq -0.198 3.164 -0.129 0.084 0.016 -0.008 0.048 -0.018 -2,946.36 -2,948
Kazakhstan -0.197 0.476 -0.100 -0.010 0.057 0.077 -0.283 -0.005 4,933.20 4,919
Malaysia 0.007 -0.820 -0.002 -2.848 -0.002 -2.848 -1,127.64 -1,128
Mexico 1.509 -16.357 1.012 -13.003 -0.814 -16.640 -3.449 -24.518 -2,271.02 -2,193
Morocco 3.602 43.321 3.285 -10.645 -0.805 -1.033 -4.009 -17.264 -3,107.47 -2,983
Nigeria 3.994 32.470 2.939 0.571 -6.231 -33.810 -6.473 -33.809 -1,816.96 -1,699
Peru 0.832 -0.001 0.632 -1.384 -0.294 -9.170 -0.422 -10.997 -1,352.85 -1,347
Philippinnes 0.391 -10.624 -0.410 -11.946 -0.400 -11.946 -2,892.58 -2,881
South Korea 0.046 -3.732 -0.053 -3.760 -0.052 -3.760 -3,410.54 -3,409
Tunisia -0.190 1.784 -0.121 0.120 0.047 0.041 0.235 0.162 -1,158.71 -1,161
United A.E 0.317 2.707 -0.172 -1.267 -0.172 -1.267 -688.48 -687
Venezuela 0.010 -0.175 0.006 -0.219 -0.005 -3.244 -0.005 -3.245 -1,332.62 -1,333
AFD 1.461 -6.831 1.600 -4.003 -1.104 -15.502 -1.863 -19.516 -1,602.48 -1,573
CTA 0.063 1.063 -0.032 -2.422 -0.032 -2.422 -3,096.13 -3,095
STA 0.463 -7.364 0.450 -6.849 -0.221 -6.799 -1.179 -10.417 -1,489.62 -1,472
ASG 0.367 -5.287 0.317 -3.387 -0.273 -7.475 -0.645 -10.204 -2,697.32 -2,680
MEG -0.196 3.047 0.078 0.442 0.078 0.442 -1,227.16 -1,228
ROW -0.198 3.050 -0.152 0.758 0.156 0.253 0.896 0.635 -5,785.65 -5,837
Least Developed
Bangladesh -0.075 2.106 -0.026 -0.538 0.041 -0.963 0.125 -1.352 -1,412.78 -1,415
Ethiopia 0.874 3.857 0.345 -1.053 -0.429 -1.891 -2.857 -3.086 -738.18 -717
Yemen -0.195 2.379 -0.046 0.008 0.082 0.079 0.092 0.083 -1,922.04 -1,924
SAG 0.039 -2.444 0.032 -0.884 -0.026 -3.815 -0.036 -4.037 -1,802.41 -1,802
NAG 0.241 -2.666 0.214 -0.481 -0.222 -4.766 -0.232 -4.816 -1,344.61 -1,341
WORLD -0.198 3.164 -0.016 -0.432 -0.016 -0.432 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.000
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COUNTRY Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev
Developed
Australia 0.114 1.852 0.082 0.453 -0.291 -0.452 -0.131 -0.430
Canada 0.458 2.994 0.078 0.264 -0.288 -0.186 -0.120 -0.296
EU-25 0.047 -0.316 0.045 -0.254 -0.060 -1.054 5.362 4.282 -0.003 -0.115
Israel 0.453 2.659 0.034 0.034 -0.243 2.217 -0.084 1.142 0.054 0.073
Japan 0.491 1.167 0.226 0.741 -0.450 -0.013 0.084 -0.078 0.182 0.596
USA 0.911 3.844 0.037 0.210 -0.204 -0.204 18.380 11.860 -0.028 -0.211
DCG 0.372 2.268 0.138 0.270 -0.560 0.567 0.121 -0.057 0.095 0.175
Developing
Algeria 0.017 -0.809 -0.107 -0.611 6.617 149.276 0.063 0.004
Argentina 0.133 0.338 -0.276 -0.179 -0.121 -0.244
Brazil -3.962 -11.127 -0.895 -8.967 0.913 -3.107 8.705 143.263 0.054 -0.131
China 0.328 3.105 0.252 2.279 -0.211 -0.563 0.000 0.000 0.004 -0.063
Columbia -0.318 -6.513 0.395 -3.411 4.531 134.869 0.102 0.071
Egypt -0.058 -1.795 0.143 -2.202 9.655 135.326 0.034 -0.029
Indonesia -0.034 -1.756 A B 0.416 0.396
Iran 0.075 0.176 -0.290 -0.020 0.029 0.060
Iraq 0.031 0.008 -0.280 -0.048 0.025 0.005
Kazakhstan 0.353 0.661 0.037 0.006 -0.264 -0.127 -0.045 -0.054
Malaysia -0.012 -3.076 1.982 121.813 0.113 0.512
Mexico -8.182 -20.585 -1.436 -15.466 2.134 -15.723 4.917 50.625 -0.171 -1.697
Morocco -1.660 -2.023 4.755 -8.101 8.935 45.138 -0.364 1.217
Nigeria -12.980 -39.609 6.445 5.644 2.443 22.345 -3.968 -22.732
Peru -0.672 -10.007 1.332 -0.787 5.948 172.167 0.081 -0.050
Philippinnes -2.269 -12.935 -0.313 -4.768 4.353 248.372 0.117 -0.283
South Korea -0.433 -4.736 -0.048 -3.030 0.046 -3.732 6.540 707.732 0.228 1.190
Tunisia 0.095 0.089 -0.271 0.050 0.074 -0.132 0.040 0.033
United A.E -0.437 -1.558 0.317 2.707 15.080 82.608 0.185 0.128
Venezuela -0.023 -3.599 0.011 -0.359 1.514 90.198 0.137 0.220
AFD -2.367 -17.289 2.873 -2.613 5.891 87.110 -0.261 -2.985
CTA -0.091 -2.698 0.063 1.063 6.439 167.643 0.197 0.425
STA -0.467 -7.179 0.777 -6.175 7.077 65.368 0.025 0.168
ASG -0.698 -5.702 -0.559 -7.376 0.545 -3.338 6.281 102.112 0.078 0.214
MEG 0.156 0.534 -0.196 3.047 0.798 241.870 0.153 0.539
ROW 0.356 3.323 0.306 0.317 -0.314 0.888 0.658 0.102 0.063 0.104
Least Developed
Bangladesh 0.061 -1.140 -0.097 -0.693 3.429 30.210 0.061 0.119
Ethiopia -0.899 -2.181 1.055 -1.301 24.878 35.061 0.005 0.020
Yemen 0.163 0.166 -0.220 0.072 0.146 0.160
SAG -0.072 -4.207 0.059 -1.047 4.122 172.449 0.180 0.628
NAG -0.527 -5.482 0.415 -0.312 7.622 139.887 0.276 0.575
WORLD -0.131 -4.478
-$146,104,000 Welfare Difference From Baseline ($US)
A = $8,833,667; B = $33,839,608   27
Table 8: Swiss-25 Tariff Cuts - With SSM 




Total Wheat Use 
(%)
Net Trade Wheat 
(%)
Net Trade Wheat 
(1000mt)
COUNTRY Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev SWA SWA SSG
Developed
Australia -0.189 0.739 -0.111 -0.091 0.048 0.481 -0.174 -0.098 17,636 17,605
Canada -0.189 1.189 -0.116 -0.092 0.125 0.900 -0.211 -0.082 18,247 18,208
EU-25 -0.099 -0.553 -0.059 -0.468 0.057 -0.545 -3.539 -1.152 3,734 3,601
Israel -0.189 1.000 -0.074 1.000 0.107 0.560 0.117 0.580 -1,434 -1,435
Japan -0.189 0.268 -0.333 -0.019 0.045 0.134 0.051 0.165 -9,197 -9,202
USA -0.209 0.601 -0.097 -0.062 0.098 1.025 -0.326 -0.112 28,370 28,277
DCG -0.189 0.942 -0.372 0.257 0.051 0.117 0.143 0.311 -2,613 -2,617
Developing
Algeria -0.091 0.314 -0.056 -0.376 0.020 -0.496 0.043 -0.931 -4,831 -4,833
Argentina -0.189 1.533 -0.104 -0.090 0.064 0.120 -0.173 -0.093 11,724 11,704
Brazil 0.628 -7.253 0.434 -2.220 -0.357 -7.004 -0.625 -7.283 -7,170 -7,125
China -0.189 1.523 -0.027 -0.085 0.130 1.191 -3.664 -0.323 4,529 4,363
Columbia 0.375 -3.463 -0.129 -5.088 -0.132 -5.088 -1,165 -1,163
Egypt 0.071 -2.215 0.034 -1.746 -0.016 -1.575 -0.069 -2.839 -6,013 -6,009
Indonesia -0.072 -2.154 0.081 -1.046 0.080 -1.046 -3,609 -3,612
Iran -0.189 1.387 -0.124 0.029 0.036 0.068 0.272 0.077 -5,905 -5,921
Iraq -0.189 1.533 -0.124 0.035 0.016 -0.004 0.047 -0.008 -2,931 -2,932
Kazakhstan -0.189 0.113 -0.097 -0.019 0.056 0.013 -0.268 -0.021 5,085 5,071
Malaysia -0.014 -1.665 0.004 -2.580 0.004 -2.580 -1,131 -1,131
Mexico 2.772 -7.691 1.799 -6.405 -1.290 -8.576 -4.730 -12.589 -2,758 -2,628
Morocco 4.052 -0.145 3.616 -1.617 -0.695 -0.966 -2.960 -2.743 -3,794 -3,682
Nigeria 7.352 -22.827 4.795 -0.278 -5.118 -2.603 -5.247 -2.653 -2,779 -2,633
Peru 0.903 -2.352 0.677 -1.990 -0.296 -7.605 -0.422 -9.285 -1,390 -1,384
Philippinnes 0.474 -11.288 -0.470 -12.522 -0.460 -12.522 -2,971 -2,958
South Korea -0.044 -2.840 0.052 -2.864 0.051 -2.864 -3,350 -3,352
Tunisia 1.838 3.211 1.143 -2.863 -0.429 -2.748 -2.013 -5.899 -1,236 -1,212
United A.E 0.241 1.272 -0.134 -1.128 -0.134 -1.128 -683 -682
Venezuela 0.041 -1.203 0.022 -0.257 -0.018 -3.601 -0.018 -3.603 -1,349 -1,349
AFD 2.414 -5.656 2.672 -2.403 -1.519 -10.340 -2.444 -13.056 -1,811 -1,767
CTA -0.004 -0.284 0.002 -1.958 0.002 -1.958 -3,073 -3,073
STA 0.348 -6.394 0.339 -5.555 -0.165 -5.679 -0.868 -8.670 -1,514 -1,501
ASG 0.262 -4.886 0.227 -2.763 -0.194 -6.397 -0.456 -8.511 -2,717 -2,705
MEG -0.189 1.539 0.077 0.191 0.077 0.191 -1,217 -1,217
ROW -0.189 1.460 -0.146 0.297 0.155 0.105 0.970 0.257 -5,219 -5,270
Least Developed
Bangladesh -0.385 0.777 -0.134 -0.423 0.218 -0.826 0.667 -1.146 -1,382 -1,392
Ethiopia 1.437 3.579 0.573 -1.053 -0.720 -2.012 -4.975 -3.244 -706 -671
Yemen -0.189 1.198 -0.045 0.005 0.082 0.041 0.092 0.043 -1,902 -1,904
SAG -0.047 -2.244 -0.039 -0.917 0.032 -2.741 0.044 -2.965 -1,786 -1,787
NAG 0.125 -2.647 0.111 -0.457 -0.117 -4.092 -0.123 -4.142 -1,333 -1,332
WORLD -0.189 1.533 -0.022 -0.251 -0.021 -0.251 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.000
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COUNTRY Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev
Developed
Australia 0.112 0.801 0.080 0.204 -0.273 -0.309 -0.125 -0.294
Canada 0.450 1.452 0.076 0.131 -0.274 -0.228 -0.118 -0.252
EU-25 0.115 -0.493 0.110 -0.431 -0.143 -1.082 4.408 2.418 -0.002 -0.125
Israel 0.438 1.249 0.033 0.021 -0.234 0.915 -0.074 0.482 0.052 0.037
Japan 0.139 0.344 0.081 0.145 -0.477 -0.243 -0.139 0.322 0.067 0.127
USA 0.906 2.041 0.036 0.085 -0.274 -0.263 17.764 11.453 -0.028 -0.143
DCG 0.185 1.035 0.081 0.085 -0.698 -0.111 -0.050 -0.075 0.067 0.074
Developing
Algeria 0.040 -0.479 -0.170 -0.560 4.676 131.220 0.060 0.064
Argentina 0.130 0.187 -0.264 -0.251 -0.119 -0.232
Brazil -3.019 -9.445 -0.696 -7.410 0.732 -2.428 10.820 165.506 0.081 -0.095
China 0.334 1.713 0.257 1.267 -0.207 -0.458 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.095
Columbia -0.288 -5.509 0.375 -3.463 6.667 176.209 0.107 0.061
Egypt -0.037 -1.660 0.077 -2.538 7.184 116.182 0.032 0.021
Indonesia 0.101 -1.283 AB 0.410 0.264
Iran 0.073 0.106 -0.279 -0.103 0.028 0.036
Iraq 0.031 0.013 -0.275 -0.124 0.025 0.009
Kazakhstan 0.347 0.280 0.037 0.014 -0.254 -0.185 -0.045 -0.080
Malaysia 0.003 -2.754 2.424 151.275 0.112 0.278
Mexico -10.431 -12.238 -2.244 -8.355 4.055 -7.067 20.334 99.407 -0.122 -0.280
Morocco -1.432 -1.668 6.741 1.549 26.852 47.814 -0.130 0.086
Nigeria -9.936 -7.591 11.091 6.657 39.381 59.266 -0.977 -0.125
Peru -0.665 -8.129 1.430 -1.530 10.885 237.391 0.103 0.200
Philippinnes -2.414 -12.963 -0.361 -4.616 7.661 347.341 0.131 -0.206
South Korea 0.068 -3.566 0.034 -2.311 -0.044 -2.840 4.629 551.247 0.223 0.563
Tunisia -0.882 -3.111 2.498 -2.711 20.223 69.447 -0.010 -0.088
United A.E -0.353 -1.378 0.241 1.272 14.727 82.057 0.183 0.104
Venezuela -0.049 -3.929 0.052 -0.479 2.660 140.345 0.136 0.112
AFD -3.101 -11.315 5.037 -0.017 19.671 143.133 -0.141 -0.776
CTA -0.016 -2.176 -0.004 -0.284 5.390 154.513 0.193 0.295
STA -0.349 -5.968 0.578 -5.093 8.335 76.798 0.039 0.080
ASG -0.498 -5.234 -0.401 -6.194 0.378 -2.777 7.129 114.353 0.095 0.074
MEG 0.154 0.272 -0.189 1.539 -0.113 0.317 0.149 0.265
ROW 0.350 1.659 0.302 0.220 -0.304 0.267 0.762 -0.059 0.054 0.109
Least Developed
Bangladesh 0.412 -0.784 -0.471 -1.148 -3.209 21.941 0.057 0.101
Ethiopia -1.472 -2.570 1.765 -0.846 40.560 53.508 -0.010 0.003
Yemen 0.162 0.125 -0.214 -0.051 0.142 0.120
SAG 0.049 -3.005 -0.087 -1.119 3.096 147.130 0.181 0.321
NAG -0.306 -4.689 0.209 -0.392 6.893 135.105 0.283 0.143
WORLD -0.118 -4.678
-$133,036,000 Welfare Difference From Baseline ($US)
A = $5,800,834; B = $26,098,719 